An Off-Chip Attack on Hardware Enclaves via the Memory Bus

Dayeol Lee

This paper shows how an attacker can break the confidentiality of a hardware enclave with Membuster, an off-chip attack based on snooping the memory bus. An attacker with physical access can observe an unencrypted address bus and extract fine-grained memory access patterns of the victim. Membuster is qualitatively different from prior on-chip attacks to enclaves and is more difficult to thwart.

We highlight several challenges for Membuster. First, DRAM requests are only visible on the memory bus at last-level cache misses. Second, the attack needs to incur minimal interference or overhead to the victim to prevent the detection of the attack. Lastly, the attacker needs to reverse-engineer the translation between virtual, physical, and DRAM addresses to perform a robust attack. We introduce three techniques, critical page whitelistingcache squeezing, and oracle-based fuzzy matching algorithm to increase cache misses for memory accesses that are useful for the attack, with no detectable interference to the victim, and to convert memory accesses to sensitive data. We demonstrate Membuster on an Intel SGX CPU to leak confidential data from two applications: Hunspell and Memcached. We show that a single uninterrupted run of the victim can leak most of the sensitive data with high accuracy.

Published On: August 12, 2020

Presented At/In: 29th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 20)

Link: https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity20/presentation/lee-dayeol

Authors: Dayeol Lee, Dongha Jung, Ian Fang, Chia-Che Tsai, Raluca Ada Popa